Elaine Walster, G. William Walster, Ellen Berscheid

Equity Theory and Intimate Relationships

Excerpt from: Walster, Walster, and Berscheid: Equity: Theory & Research, Chapt. 6; Allyn and Bacon, Inc., Boston/London/Sydney/Toronto 1978. Reproduced here with the permission of the copyright holders.
 

 

CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION

DEFINITION: WHAT IS INTIMACY?

EQUITY IN CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS

EQUITY IN ROMANTIC AND MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS

EQUITY IN PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS

SUMMARY

ENDNOTES

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

In the preceding sections, we have explored the ability of Equity theory to provide insights into casual relationships. We reviewed an extensive body of equity research, which documents that casual relationships will endure only so long as they are profitable to both participants. However, when Equity theorists turn to intimate relationships - those between close friends, lovers, mates, and parents and children - and suggest that these, too, must be dependent on the equitable exchange of rewards - objections are quickly raised. People indignantly insist that intimate relations are "special" relations and untainted by crass considerations of profit and social exchange.

In Liking and Loving, Rubin (1973) eloquently states this point of view:

 

The notion that people are "commodities" and social relationships are "transactions" will surely make many readers squirm. Exchange theory postulates that human relationships are based first and foremost on self-interest .... Such characterizations contrast sharply with what many of us would like to think of friendship and love, that they are intimate relationships characterized at least as much by the joy of giving as by the desire to receive. But although we might prefer to believe otherwise, we must face up to the fact that our attitudes toward other people are determined to a large extent by our assessments of the rewards they hold for us.

Having said all this about the value of exchange theory, however, it is time to consider its limitations. For the fact is that, even when presented in its most enlightened form, a theory that presumes an overriding human desire to maximize one's own - and only one's own - profits inevitably falls short of providing a complete understanding of human relationships. Contrary to the guiding assumption of the exchange perspective, human beings are sometimes altruistic in the fullest sense of the word*. . . . There are many recorded instances - and countless other unrecorded ones - of people making great sacrifices for the sake of other people's welfare. . . . Examples here include the mother-infant relationship, kinship relationships between close friends, good neighbors, and the relationship of man to God.**

The principles of the interpersonal marketplace are most likely to prevail in encounters between strangers and casual acquaintances and in the early stages of the development of relationships. As an interpersonal bond becomes more firmly established, however, it begins to go beyond exchange. In close relationships one becomes decreasingly concerned with what he can gel from the other person and increasingly concerned with what he can do for the other.t (pp. 82-87)

 

*Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," American Sociological Review, 1960,25, 161-179.

**Elizabeth Douvan, "Changing Sex Roles: Some Implications and Constraints," paper presented at a symposium on "Women, Resources in a Changing World," The Radcliffe Institute, April, 1972.

t From Liking and Loving: An Invitation to Social Psychology by Zick Rubin. Copyright © 1973 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

 

Anticipating inevitable opposition, then, we still contend that Equity theory will provide important insights into the daily workings of even the most intimate relationships. Who do people choose for friends? What kind of matches are happiest? What do parents "owe" their children? What do children "owe" their parents? Issues such as these will be illuminated by an awareness of the critical importance of exchange in intimate human relationships.

Before we present our "case" for Equity theory and intimate relationships, we must point out that while this is probably the most interesting of our chapters, it is, necessarily, the most theoretical and speculative. For thousands of years, philosophers, dramatists, and poets have speculated about intimacy. However, intimate relationships are so complex that, until recently, they have seemed to defy controlled analysis and experimentation. Few research data are available. Hopefully, as a general theory of human behavior develops, and as research methodology grows increasingly sophisticated, the possibilities for careful, controlled study of dynamic intimate interactions will grow too.1 Accordingly, in this section we will suggest a number of equity hypotheses and avenues of research and we hope the reader will be stimulated to think of still others.

 

DEFINITION: WHAT IS INTIMACY?

 

Intimate /'int-e-met/ adj. [alter. of obs. intime, fr. L. intimus] 1 a:INTRINSIC, ESSENTIAL b:belonging to or characterizing one's deepest nature 2: marked by a warm friendship developing through long association 3 a:marked by very close association, contact, or familiarity. b:suggesting informal warmth or privacy. 4: of a very personal or private nature.

 

It seems best to begin our discussion with a definition of what we mean by intimacy. We began by asking ourselves: What are the characteristics of intimate relationships? Why are they so difficult to rationally examine and understand? Why are they so hotly defended as "special"? Supreme Court Justice Stewart once said of pornography that he couldn't define it, "But I know it when I see it." Most of us would echo his statement with regard to intimate relationships: we know them when we see them - but how to define them? Several possibilities occurred to us.

Certain relationships recognized by law, such as marital and family relationships, are generally considered intimate. (In fact, we will closely scrutinize such relationships later in the chapter.) Yet, most of us have witnessed legally intimate relationships that do not seem to merit the term. A husband and wife may share bed, board, and television set, but if they never share their hopes, fears, and affection, are they truly intimate? To us it seems not.

Pop culture, via advertisements, movies, television, and songs, provides us with myriad indicants of intimacy: bells ring, beautiful people gaze lovingly at one another, and constant harmony and happiness prevail. Clearly, these descriptors ignore the subtleties and intricacies of intimate relationships.

T-groups, Esalen community experiences, and sensitivity workshops claim to foster "instant intimacy - no strings attached" among participants. Yet, many would argue that it is the presence of just such "strings" - i.e., the presence of mutual commitments and responsibilities, which produce and sustain intimacy.

In the course of our dialogue, one fact emerged clearly, intimate relationships are varied and complex. Probably every person who has been intimate with another would offer a different definition of intimacy. Nor can we offer an air-tight definition. As a first approximation at a definition, however, we will conceptually define intimates as "loving persons whose lives are deeply intertwined."

When we reflect upon such relationships, relationships between best friends, lovers, spouses, and parents and children, it appears that they are generally marked by a number of characteristics. Let us enumerate some of these characteristics.

 

Characteristics of Intimate Relationships

 

Intimate Relationships-.  Relationships between loving persons whose lives are deeply intertwined.

 

Intensity of Liking (Loving). Intimate relationships are carried on by people who like or love one another. Of course, human relationships are complex. Sometimes intimates feel simple liking or love for one another, but more often their affection is interlaced with occasional feelings of dislike or even hatred. However, if an intimate relationship is to remain intimate, participants must basically like or love one another.

 

Depth and Breadth of Information Exchange. In casual relationships, individuals usually exchange only the sketchiest of information. Intimates generally share profound information about one another's personal histories, values, strengths and weaknesses, idiosyncrasies, hopes, and fears.

Altman and Taylor (1973) provide a painstaking analysis of the "Social Penetration" process. Their comparison of the extremes of intimacy provides a vivid example of the difference between the amount and kind of information exchanged in casual versus intimate relationships.

 

Stage 1: Orientation:

 

Whether at a cocktail party, a small social gathering, or on a first date, individuals make only a small part of themselves accessible. . . Their responses are not very rich or broad, are often stereotyped, reflect only the most superficial aspects of their modes of response, and demonstrate little personal uniqueness . . . they smile graciously and easily, are quick to nod agreement and understanding, offer greetings without hesitation, and exhibit a range of behaviors to present the image of a pleasant, understanding, likable person.

 

Stage 4: Stable exchange:

 

Achieved in only a few relationships, stable exchange continues to reflect openness, richness, spontaneity, and so on in public areas. . . . Dyad members know one another well and can readily interpret and predict the feelings and probable behavior of the other. . . . For the first time, perhaps, there is a considerable richness of communication in the central core areas and a high degree of mutual spontaneity, permeability, and dyadic uniqueness. In addition to verbal levels, there is a great deal of exchange of nonverbal and environmental behaviors, and less restrictiveness in facial expressions, gestures, body movements, touching and so on. They are more willing to allow each other to use, have access to, or know about very private apparel and belongings. (pp. 136-141)

 

On the basis of their review of the voluminous self-disclosure research, Altman and Taylor conclude that, with few exceptions, as intimacy progresses, "interpersonal exchange gradually progresses from superficial, nonintimate areas to more intimate, deeper layers of the selves of the social actors." (p. 6) The more intimate we are with someone, the more information we are willing to reveal to him and the more we expect him to reveal to us.2

 

Length of Relationship. Casual relationships are usually short-term. Intimate relationships are expected to endure, and generally do endure, over a long period of time. For example, Toffler (1970) cites husband-wife relationships and parent-child relationships as the most enduring of all relationships. " 'Til death do us part" is still our cultural ideal for marriage. As we cautioned in our introductory statement, exceptions to these conditions are easily found. A casual business relationship may last for generations, while an intimate relationship may run its course in a few months. As a general rule, however, intimate relationships tend to be long-term relationships.

This fact should have two important consequences for the way equity/inequity principles operate in intimate relationships.

 

Perception of inequity: It should be easier to calculate equity in casual relationships than in intimate ones. Over a short span it is easy to assess who owes whom what. Strangers in a bar need only remember who bought the last drink to determine who should pick up the tab for the next round. In intimate relationships it is far more difficult to calculate equity. Should the drinks I served my husband when we were dating "count" in determining who should pay for the case of Scotch we bought today? How far back in a relationship is it fair to go in making such calculations?

In the short-term relationships Equity theorists have studied heretofore, participants could usually distinguish with some ease what was equitable and what was not. We suspect, however, that participants in intimate relationships may have a far harder time even defining equity/inequity.

 

Until their relationship reaches a certain point, they feel obligated to make a specific repayment for each favor received. Beyond this point, the closest of friends (as well as most lovers and spouses) do not feel obligated to give, or expect to receive, a specific repayment for each service rendered; rather, each feels the total amount of favors he gives and receives will average out over the course of their friendship. (Davis, 1973, p. 132)

 

Tolerance of perceived inequity: Participants in casual vs. intimate relationships may differ in their insistence that perceived inequities be redressed immediately. Casuals may be fully aware that unless existing imbalances are redressed soon, they will probably never be redressed at all. Intimates, committed to long-range interaction, should be more tolerant of momentary imbalances, since they know that they will have ample time in the future to set things right.3

The recent movie Paper Moon provides a comic illustration of this point.4 Nine-year old Addie has convinced herself that Mose (a traveling con man) is her father. As long as they have a father/child relationship, she allows him to freely spend her money on himself. The moment she realizes that their "partnership" is about to end, however, her feelings change precipitously. She suddenly begins to insist loudly, "I want my $200!"

 

Value of Resources Exchanged. A variety of exchange theorists have observed that as a relationship grows in intimacy, the value of the rewards and punishments a pair can give one another increases.5

 

A friend's frown is better than a foe's smile.

                                                                               James Howell, Proverbs

 

Value of rewards: Many theorists have observed that intimates' rewards are especially potent. For example, Huesmann and Levinger's (1976) elegant "incremental exchange model of dyadic interaction" has as its fundamental assumption: "that the expected value of a dyad's rewards increases as the depth of their relationship increases." (p. 6) Levinger, Senn, and Jorgensen (1970) point out that the same reward ("I'm glad I met you") is far more potent when it comes from an intimate than from a casual.

In addition,  intimates possess a bigger storehouse of rewards than do casuals. Generally, people are more willing to invest their resources in an intimate relationship than a casual one. Thus, intimates usually provide their partners with more and more valuable rewards (time, effort, intimate information, money) than do casuals.

Value of punishments: Intimates' rewards may be unusually potent, but so are the punishments they can inflict on each other. For example, if a stranger at a party loudly announces that I am a selfish bore, I lose little; I can dismiss his words as those of a creep who doesn't really know what kind of a person I am. But if my best friend were to tell me the same thing, I would be crushed - she knows me, and still thinks that! As Aronson (1970) succinctly put it: "Familiarity may breed reward, but it also breeds the capacity to hurt."

Benefits of maintaining the relationship; costs of terminating it: Finally, we would like to note that intimates command one unique and potentially potent punishment: they can threaten to terminate the relationship. Earlier we indicated that people feel that intimate relationships should be long-term relationships. Best friends should remain friends through thick and thin. Husbands and wives should remain married "until death do us part." Parents should stand by their children. Thus, if an intimate is willing to suffer himself, he has the potential to deliver a devastating blow to his partner. He has the power to expose his partner to public humiliation; to make it clear to everyone that his friend, or spouse, or child is a "defective" person.

The intimate, who is willing to "cut off his nose to spite his face," can punish his partner in more practical ways. People take their relationships for granted; they come to depend on them. When a person precipitously terminates an intimate relationship, he abandons his partner to a lonely and painful unknown.

 

Variety of Resources Exchanged. As a relationship grows in intensity, the variety of rewards and punishments a pair can give one another increases.

Recent theoretical and empirical work by Uriel Foa and his associates, provides a useful framework for discussing this point. So, let us digress for a moment, and discuss their research in some detail.

Foa (and others)6 have argued that the resources of interpersonal exchange fall into six classes: (1) love, (2) status, (3) information, (4) money, (5) goods, and (6) services.

According to the authors, all resources can be classified according to their "particularism" and "concreteness." The dimension particularism refers to the extent to which the resource's value is influenced by the person who delivers it. Since money is valuable regardless of its source, it is classed as nonparticularistic. Since love's value depends very much on who is doing the loving, it is classed as "particularistic."7 The dimension concreteness refers to the resource's characteristic form of expression. Since services and goods involve the exchange of tangibles - things you can see, smell, and touch - they are classed as concrete. Since status and information are usually conveyed verbally, they are classed as symbolic.

 

FIGURE 6.1. Foa's Typology of Resources of Interpersonal Exchange. (From U.G. Foa, "Interpersonal and Economic Resources," Science, 171, 1971.)

 

We suspect that casual versus intimate relationships may differ markedly in both the variety and the types of resources participants commonly exchange.

We suspect that in casual exchanges, participants generally exchange only a few types of resources. In addition, since casual relationships are such short-term relationships, we suspect that casuals probably feel lucky if they can manage to negotiate an exchange of resources whose value is commonly understood. Casuals simply aren't "in business" long enough to work out any very complicated or troublesome exchanges. Thus we suspect that casuals' exchanges are generally focused primarily on nonparticularistic and concrete resources (i.e., money, goods, services, and information).

We suspect that in intimate exchanges, however, participants generally exchange resources from all six classes. Like casuals, intimates can exchange nonparticularistic and concrete resources. But, in addition, they can, and do, go to the trouble of negotiating more complicated exchanges. They can work out exchanges of symbolic and particularistic resources (love, status, services, and information). (It may even be that intimates are primarily concerned with such exchanges.)

If casuals usually exchange concrete and nonparticularistic resources, while intimates exchange not only these but a variety of other resources, whose value depends on each scrutineer's idiosyncratic evaluation of both the giver and the reward, this fact provides a second reason why it is easier in casual than in intimate relationships to calculate equity. Casuals are exchanging resources of set value; thus, it is fairly easy to calculate equity. Intimates exchange these set value commodities, plus a potpourri of ambiguous value commodities. It is no wonder, then, that intimates may find the calculation of equity/inequity a mind-boggling task.

 

Interchangeability of Resources. We venture into far shakier territory with our next characteristic of intimacy. We would speculate that, within a particular exchange, casuals tend to be limited to exchanging resources from the same class. Intimates, on the other hand, have far more freedom to exchange resources from entirely different classes. Let us describe the research that leads us to this prediction.

Research on the Foa typology suggests that equity is more easily established when an exchange involves similar resource classes (i.e., those that are close together on Foa's "circle"). A study by Turner, Foa, and Foa, (1971) showed that people prefer that two-way exchanges use resources of the same class: love given, love returned; services for services; money for money. We all know how disconcerting it is when, for example, we give of our time to help a neighbor (service) and are offered cash in return (money). We would feel far more comfortable if our neighbor offered to help us sometime (service) when we were in a similar situation.

In a theoretical extension of the Turner et al. results, Donnenwerth and Foa (1974) examined the effect of available resources on responses to inequity. They found that the intensity of a retaliatory response is inversely related to the similarity of resources in the exchange. For example, they found that when an inequity is created in terms of love, and money is the only retaliatory resource available to the partner, far more money is needed to restore equity than if the original inequity was created in terms of money as well.

We thought about these findings, then reflected again on personal experiences, and decided that these findings may not apply equally to casual and intimate exchanges. Casual relationships usually exist in a single context, where like is exchanged for like. If I lend my notes to the classmate I see three times a week, I expect to be repaid in kind the next time I miss a lecture. If I am invited to my neighbor's parties with great regularity, I know full well that unless I reciprocate and invite her to mine, I will be considered antisocial, unappreciative, and will very likely be dropped from her guest list. But inviting her to my parties is all I need do, unless I want the relationship to progress to deeper levels, perhaps to intimacy. (In that case, I would attempt to exchange with her some of the resources characterized above as typical of intimates: affection, status, disclosure of personal information.)

In contrast, intimate relationships exist in a variety of contexts. Participants have at their disposal the whole range of interpersonal resources, and freely exchange one type for another. Thus, the wife who owes her husband money can pay him back in a number of ways: she can defer to his conclusion that he is entitled to go golfing on Sunday (status), make him a special dinner (services), or tell him how much she loves him and appreciates his generosity (love). These responses may be less satisfactory to her husband than direct monetary repayment, but not necessarily so. Intimates spend much of their time negotiating the values and exchangeability of various behaviors; negotiating the "terms" of their relationship. This is what much of getting acquainted is all about.8

Foa's studies investigated the reaction of casuals to injustice. (The subjects' encounters were not to extend beyond the experimental setting.) Participants had no chance to work out between themselves the values of a given kind of injury and a given kind of retaliation. When the values are unclear, it is always safest to "do unto them exactly what they have done unto you."

Once again, our comparison of the variety of resources involved in casual versus intimate relationships leads us to the conclusion that it is easier for everyone to calculate equity in casual relationships than in intimate ones. We have just concluded that participants in casual relationships trade "in kind." Intimates may trade vastly different resources. It is easy enough to know that a round of beer on Monday night equals a round on Tuesday. It is far more difficult to decide if dinner at an expensive restaurant on Monday balances out three nights of neglect due to a heavy work load.

 

The Unit of Analysis: From "You" and "Me" to "We." We've seen how many of the unique characteristics of intimate relationships make assessments of equity, from outside as well as inside the relationship, a formidable task. Another characteristic of intimate relationships, which may add complexity, is that intimates, through identification with and empathy for their partners, come to define themselves as a unit; as one couple. They see themselves not merely as individuals interacting with others, but also as part of a partnership, interacting with other individuals, partnerships, and groups. This characteristic may have a dramatic impact on intimates' perceptions of what is and is not equitable.

Just what do we mean when we say that intimates see themselves as a "unit"? Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying the unit is a "we." Examples of this "we-ness" are the joy and pride a parent feels at the success and happiness of his child ("That's my boy!"); the distress a wife experiences when her husband has been denied a hoped-for opportunity; the intense pleasure a lover feels while working to make his beloved happy.9 Sir John Philip Sidney beautifully illustrated this sense of identification in his love poem, "My True-Love Hath My Heart":

 

His heart in me keeps him and me in one,

My heart in him his thought and senses guides:

He loves my heart, for once it was his own,

I cherish his because in me it bides

My true-love hath my heart, and I have his.

 

Now, certainly in the examples above, the "identifiers" are directly affected by what happens to their partner: the parents may be supported in their old age by a successful son, the wife's household allowance as well as the husband's suffers when he is denied his hoped-for promotion, the lover may receive affection for his labors. But intimates' identification with their partners may cause them to experience genuine, "first hand" emotions aside from these returns. As we observed in chapter 4 ("Equity and Philanthropist/Recipient Relationships"), even casual, uninvolved observers can become distressed by the inequities they observe. How much easier for intimates, constituting socially defined units, to empathize with one another's circumstances.

A variety of theorists have noted that intimates' outcomes are linked. Rubin (1970) observes:

 

By helping one's partner, one is helping the partnership and thus helping oneself as well. Here again there is a reward involved, but it is not a reward to be gained at someone else's expense. It is, rather, a reward gained by and for the collective unit. (p. 85)

 

Society often thinks of and responds to intimate friends, lovers, and families and friends as units. Much empirical evidence exists for the folk wisdom that "A man is known by the company he keeps."10 For example, Sigall and Landy (1974) found that subjects' impressions of a man were shaped by his girlfriend's characteristics. The boyfriend was rated most favorably when the woman was extremely attractive. He was rated least favorably when the woman at his side was ugly.

Blau (1964), too, argues that intimates' outcomes often become hopelessly intertwined. He speculates:

 

The repeated experience of being rewarded by the increased attachment of a loved one after having done a variety of things to please him may have the effect that giving pleasure to loved ones becomes intrinsically gratifying, (p. 77)

 

What implications does the "we-ness" phenomenon have for the application of Equity theory to intimate relationships? There is one very important implication.

Throughout, we have stressed that if Equity theorists are to predict the behavior of individuals in a relationship, they must first be able to define the relationship: they must know who is interacting with whom. The student of intimate relationships must constantly ask what is happening in the intimate relationship at the moment of observation. Are the individuals relating to each other as individuals? Or, are they relating to others as a couple? If the intimates are relating as a couple to the rest of the world then the individual members are no longer the appropriate unit of analysis. It is the couple's inputs and outcomes which are important, and which form the basis for prediction of behavior of the individual members as a twosome.

 

Intimacy: A relationship between loving people whose lives are deeply entwined.

 

We have defined intimacy and discussed the unique characteristics of intimate relationships. Now, finally, we are ready to take a close look at three types of intimate relationships (close friendships, romantic relationships, and parent-child relationships), in order to try to determine whether or not equity considerations do apply in even the most intimate of relations.

Let us begin by examining close friendships. Then we will move on to somewhat more "exalted" relationships - romantic and marital relationships. Finally, we will end with an examination of the most "heroic" of relationships - parental relationships.

 

EQUITY IN CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS

 

When social commentators ask whether or not equity considerations operate in intimate relationships, they come up with conflicting answers.

On one hand, much of cultural folklore suggests that true friends do not care about equity. In ancient times, observers often commented on friendship's disinterestedness:

 

If men are friends, there is no need of justice between them.

                                                                          Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Bk. 8, ch. 1, sec. 5

 

Today, they still do. Douvan (1974) argues:

 

Exchange is not the motive force in interpersonal relationships. Rather it is pleasure in the relationship itself, meeting and accepting each other as whole persons, affirming each other's selves. (p. 4)

 

On the other hand, throughout time people have, with unnerving inconsistency, casually taken it for granted that equity considerations do operate in friendly encounters. In Medieval times, Chaucer was commenting:

 

If thou be poor, thy brother hateth thee,

And all thy friends do flee from thee, alas!

                                                Chaucer. Man of Law's Tale: Prologue, 1.22

 

Today, routine deliberations such as: "We've simply got to have the Mattlocks over; we've been to their house for dinner six times and we've never had them here," or, "Oh, George, do give Mary a bottle of Scotch for Christmas; she chauffered the kids to skating classes all last year," attest to the pervasiveness of equity considerations in friendly relationships.

 

The Experimental Evidence

 

What people say they expect is confusing. Is there any evidence they behave with any more consistency? Is there any evidence that equity considerations really do operate in both casual and intimate friendships? Is there any evidence that they don't? The answer is: not really. Researchers are only now beginning to explore this controversial question.

Let us consider the existing evidence. We were able to locate only three studies that explored strangers' versus friends' reactions to equity/inequity. Morgan and Sawyer (1967), in a complex study, examined the bargaining styles of friends versus acquaintances.

If an Equity theorist is to make a prediction, his first questions must be: How did the scrutineer perceive the situation? What inputs did he perceive to be relevant? How valuable did he perceive these inputs to be? What outcomes did he perceive to be relevant? How valuable did he perceive them to be? Only when he has such information can a theorist predict how fair or unfair the scrutineer will perceive participants' relative gains to be. Unfortunately, as Morgan and Sawyer observe, it is impossible to tell how the boys in their study perceived the situation. On one hand, we have every reason to believe that the boys assumed that they both possessed identical inputs. The boys were all from the same school, from the same grades (fifth and sixth), and were about the same age (ten-twelve). Presumably they were all from the same socioeconomic class (most received allowances of 50 cent a week). On these grounds, the authors conclude:

 

Within the range of ages (10-12) in this research, preference for equality is uniformly strong . . . boys generally regarded equality as the fair outcome. ... In Adams' (1963) terminology, equity calls for equal outcomes because the inputs are perceived to be equal. (pp. 145 - 146)

 

FIGURE 6.2. "Eggplant Casserole Doesn't Pay Back for Prime Ribs." (From Ladies' Home Journal, August 1975, p. 128. Copyright© 1975 Downe Publishing, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Ladies' Home Journal and Chon Day.)

 

 

On the other hand, the boys may have perceived their inputs to be distinctly unequal. The authors paired friends and acquaintances whose grades were markedly discrepant. Then they gave the boys markedly discrepant potential for reward. Boys were seated at a game board like the one in Figure 6.3. One boy could win from 0 to 300. His partner could win from 0 to $1.50. Did boys see grades as a relevant input? Potential for reward? We do not know.

In any case, things were then made still more complicated. Operating on the assumption that friends have more similar inputs than acquaintances, the author decided to duplicate that condition experimentally. With the friend pairs, the smarter boys were seated at the side of the board with the lower potential payoff. (Thus, the dual inputs of I.Q. and payoff potential worked in opposite directions.) In the acquaintance groups, the smarter boys were seated at the side of the board with the higher potential payoffs. (Thus, both inputs worked in the same direction.)

 

FIGURE 6.3. The Bargaining Board, with Quarters on the Near Side and Nickels on the Far Side. (In Practice, the Words in This Figure Do Not Appear on the Board - Only the Coins Themselves.) (From W. R. Morgan and J. Sawyer, "Bargaining, Expectations, and the Preference for Equality over Equity," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6, 1967, p. 141. Copyright© 1967 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.)

 

 

The authors then proceeded to study the bargaining behavior of the boys.

The results? When boys were allowed to reveal their expectations to their partners,11 both friends and acquaintances tended to divide rewards equally. When participants had to guess at their partner's expectations, friends and acquaintances behaved quite differently. Acquaintances still insisted on strict equality. Friends did not; in most cases, the partner with the higher potential for reward was allowed to take it. As a team, then, the acquaintances made far less money than did the friends.

The authors' conclusion? They note:

 

In fact, as Blau (1964) suggests, too quick or too strict concern with reaching equal balance in an interpersonal exchange appears to characterize nonfriends more than friends. Friends should be willing to tolerate temporary imbalances, while nonfriends want to keep their relation on more of a businesslike basis. (p. 148)

 

A second study was conducted by Benton (1971). Benton's experiment was designed to determine if boys and girls allocate resources any differently. He proposed that boys (whose ''socialization history involves constant encouragement to engage in competitive games") would feel that performance ought to be taken into account in apportioning resources. He expected that girls ("whose education has emphasized nurturance and sympathy") probably wouldn't feel this way. Luckily for us, Benton systematically studied the reactions of boys and girls who were nonfriends vs. best friends.

Benton's procedure was straightforward. Children were invited, in pairs, to take a reading test. They were told that if they both passed the reading test, they would be allowed to play with some very desirable toys; if they both failed the test, they would not. What happened if one child passed and the other did not? The experimenter said that in those circumstances, they could both play.

As the reader who is familiar with the devious ways of psychologists might guess, the test was rigged. One child always passed the test while the other failed it. (Assignment to the role of "passer" and "failer" in each pair was random.) Thus, both children, regardless of their performance, won a chance to play with the desirable toys. Benton then observed how boys and girls went about deciding who could play with what. He asked children how acceptable various toy allocations would be. For example:

 

1:5  You get to play with the toy you like best;

your partner gets to play with the toy he likes fifth best (out of

fifteen toys).

2:4 You play with the toy you like second best;

your partner gets his fourth choice toy.

3:3  Each of you gets to play with your third choice toy.

4:2 You get your fourth choice toy;

your partner gets his second choice;

5:1 You get your fifth choice toy;

your partner gets his first choice.

 

Benton's results are interesting: he found that boys, regardless of whether their partner was a friend or nonfriend, tended to assume that equity considerations should apply. (They assumed that the successful boy, who had made playing with the toys possible, ought to get to play with the better toy.) Girls responded in exactly the same way, but only when dealing with nonfriends. When girls' partners were friends, they did not feel that equity considerations should apply. (They preferred to divide things up "even steven" 3:3.)

The Morgan and Sawyer (1967) and Benton (1971) studies both provide some evidence that both casuals and close friends, at least male close friends, may be concerned about equity in their relationships.

A third study, by Traupmann (1975), went a little further. We have already enumerated some of the ways in which casuals and intimates differ:

 

1.  intensity of liking (loving)

2.  depth and breadth of information exchange

3.  length of relationship

4.  value of resources exchanged

5.  variety of resources exchanged

6.  interchangeability of resources

7.  the unit of analysis: from "you" and "me" to "we"

 

Traupmann (1975) argued that such differences should affect individuals' reactions to inequity. She proposed that strangers and friends differ in their readiness to perceive inequity and their reactions to it.

Traupmann invited college women who were either strangers (women from different dorms) or friends (dormitory roommates) to come to a verbal learning screening session. Presumably, researchers were seeking women who were both intelligent and personable to participate in a long-term, and very lucrative, verbal learning experiment.

Traupmann's "screening session" was carefully designed to convince women that they did possess the required inputs of "intelligence" and "personableness," and thus, deserved to be chosen for the long-term experiment. First, Traupmann gave two women a word list to study for ten minutes. Then she asked each woman to write down all the words she recalled. Both women were told they had done very well. It looked like they would both be chosen for the long-range experiment. Only one minor hurdle remained. Each woman would have to get a reasonable score on the "Personal Evaluation Form" if she was to participate. Her partner was to evaluate her "cooperativeness," "creativity," "ability to learn quickly," and "conscientiousness." In addition, her partner was to say whether she would or would not recommend her for the verbal learning experiment. Since each woman had done so well on the first test, and since her interaction with her partner had been so pleasant, she had no reason not to expect a reasonably good evaluation from her partner, and every reason to expect that she would be invited to participate in a lucrative three-week experiment. Then the blow fell. The experimenter reported that the woman had been given a very low rating by her partner; she had almost surely lost the opportunity to participate in the forthcoming experiment.

Traupmann predicted that friends and strangers would react in quite different ways to this inequity.

 

Perceptions of Fairness; Contentment/Distress. Traupmann observed that strangers versus friends should react very differently to two questions: (1) How equitable/inequitable was the relationship between you and your partner during the verbal-learning screening session? (2) How equitable/inequitable is your relationship overall? For strangers, the verbal-learning interaction is their relationship with their partner. For close friends, however, this incident is only a small part of their total relationship. Most intimates have a long history of pleasurable and equitable exchanges. If people could precisely partition out various segments of their interactions, we would expect strangers to feel that both this relationship (and their total relationship) was inequitable and distressing. We might expect intimates to feel this relationship was unfair and quite distressing, while at the same time feeling that their total relationship was fair and satisfying.

Traupmann, however, felt that the participants would not be capable of such fine distinctions. She predicted that if she asked women how fair their evaluation was, and how pleased or distressed they were with it, both their situation-specific experiences and their total experiences would be reflected in their report. There is some support for Traupmann's prediction. Both strangers and friends were equally sure that their partner had treated them unfairly by giving them such a negative evaluation. However, strangers were far more distressed by their low evaluation than were friends.

 

Mode of Equity Restoration: Constructive Reactions versus Destructive Ones. Traupmann also predicted that strangers and friends would use very different strategies to restore equity.

Traupmann suggested that there are two radically different ways that people can respond to a perplexing inequity. (1) They can get together and discuss their differences. (For example, Person A can explain why she expected a good evaluation; Person B can explain why she didn't give her one.) In brief, they can negotiate about what should have been done and try to figure out some way to set things right, or (2) they can respond in a destructive way. The person who feels herself to be wronged can do everything in her power to hurt the other person.

As she predicted, Traupmann found that strangers and friends responded in totally different ways to inequity. Friends, more than strangers, were eager to try to talk to their partners about the inequitable situation. Friends, more than strangers, saw such a discussion as very likely.

Traupmann also found, as predicted, that strangers were far more likely to give their partner such a low "personal evaluation" that she, too, would be eliminated from the long-term experiment. Friends were not. They were more patient. They were more likely to give their partner a fair evaluation and allow her to stay in the lucrative experiment.12  (Presumably, they expected to settle things later.)

What can we conclude from the Morgan and Sawyer (1967), Benton (1971), and Traupmann (1975) studies?

First, it appears that equity considerations apply in both casual and intimate friendships. Second, it appears that strangers find even momentary inequities distressing. Intimates do not. Third, strangers appear to be unwilling to tolerate temporary imbalances in the relationship. Intimates do not. Finally, it appears that when friends do set out to restore equity, they try to respond in ways that will not damage the relationship. Strangers seem to be far more likely to "let the Devil take the hindmost."

One can't be very confident about these conclusions, however. Far more research will have to be done before we feel comfortable about saying anything with certainty regarding equitable relationships among close friends.

 

 

EQUITY IN ROMANTIC AND MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS

 

Introduction

 

When Equity theorists contend that equity considerations apply not only in casual relationships, but perhaps even in close friendships as well, many readers can grudgingly agree. However, when Equity theorists proceed one step further, and suggest that equity considerations shape romantic and marital relationships, many readers rebel. They insist that these are "special" relationships.

For example, Erich Fromm is probably the most popular proponent of the notion that "true" love goes beyond exchange. In The Art of Loving (1956), Fromm admits that most flawed "human love relations follow the same pattern of exchange which governs the commodity and labor market." (p. 3) But, he contends, unconditional love, which is love given without expectation or desire for anything in return, is the truest, strongest, and best type of love.13

A variety of theorists agree with the contention that love transcends equity.14

An equally prominent group of theorists insists that equity considerations do apply in intimate relationships. For example, Scanzoni (1972) observes:

 

These realities of courtship and marriage tend to be clouded ... by the romantic love complex, which dictates that prospective partners are not supposed to weigh reward elements, at least consciously. Nonrational, romantic person-centered considerations are supposed to be paramount - lesser elements are too crass to be included. . . . Not that suppressing the reality of the process makes it disappear either before or after marriage. . . . Males and females socialized into their differing roles prior to marriage seek the different kinds of rewards from each other that they have learned are appropriate to their roles; they enter marriage because they perceive it will continue to supply these particular rewards and gratifications; they remain in the relationship so long as expected rewards are forthcoming; they withdraw from it if rewards diminish below and costs exceed desired expectations, (p. 54)

 

Patterson (1971) observes;

 

There is an odd kind of equity which holds when people interact with each other. In effect, we get what we give, both in amount and in kind. Each of us seems to have his own bookkeeping system for love, and for pain. Over time, the books are balanced. (p. 26)

 

Other theorists agree that in love relationships, as in all other relationships, considerations of equity, and the marketplace, prevail.15

Faced with the compelling arguments that "intimate relationships transcend equity considerations" versus "intimate relationships embody equity considerations," we can only consider the evidence. There is some sparse evidence that equity considerations may operate both in mate selection and in the day-to-day interactions of an intimate relationship.

 

Mate Selection

 

Psychological counselors often act as if marriage is a unique relationship. They ruefully acknowledge that in all of life except marriage, one must settle for what one can get. When they begin to talk about marriage, however, they act as if everyone is entitled to "the best."

For example, Herter (1974) warns young men to use "logic and common sense" in choosing a wife. He advises them to make sure that their wife possesses the following basic assets. She should:

 

1.  Be beautiful.

2.  Be younger than you.

3.  Be shorter than you.

4.  Be the same religion.

5.  Be the same race.

6.  Be willing to pretend to be equally intelligent or less intelligent than you.

7.  Be a virgin at the time you meet.

8.  Be willing to live with you for a year before marriage to see if things work out.

9.  Be willing to let you participate in the sports you like.

10.  Be tolerant of the work you do; be tolerant of your ambitions and abilities.

11.  Be willing to have as many sons as you want.

12.  Be sexually desirable.

13.  Be free from diabetes.

14.  Not be a regular drinker.

15.  Have not used marihuana, LSD, or similar drugs.

16.  Not have a family history of insanity.

17.  Have large breasts.

18.  Have consent of both parents.

19.  Be a good cook.

20.  Be a good sewer and knitter.

21.  Not be a complainer or arguer.

22.  Be clean and neat.

23.  Not be overweight.

24.  Not snore.

 

"Logic and common sense," says Herter.

Ann Landers (1975) gives similar advice when counseling women about how to go about selecting a mate.

 

By ANN LANDERS

(From  The Wisconsin State Journal, Madison (November 1975): 4. Reprinted by permission.)

 

Dear Ann: Here's a message to all women in search of a man - object matrimony.

Most couples who are in love talk about how many babies they are going to have, what kind of house they want and where they'd like to vacation. They don't get to the vital issues until after marriage. Then they discover that one is at the North Pole and the other is at the South Pole.

If you want to find out if you and your beloved have a chance for a good life together, ask the following questions. If you don't like the answers, don't fool yourself into thinking he'll change later. He won't.

 

One. How does he handle problems and pressure? Does he go to pieces? Blame others when things go wrong? Or remain calm and search for the best solution?

Two. How does he feel about women? Does he believe they are inferior to men and can't possibly make important decisions?

Three. How does he feel about housework? Does he think it is below his dignity?

Four. How does he feel about children? Do they annoy him or does he enjoy them? What part does he feel a father should play in the rearing of children? Does he believe it's strictly the mother's job?

Five. Is he stingy when it comes to spending money on you but somewhat extravagant with himself?

Six. How does he feel about his job? Is he content to keep doing the same thing for the rest of his life? (If so, you can be sure he'll complain later that he never got a break.)

Seven.  What is your social life like? Do you find yourself spending all your spare time with his family and friends and very little with yours? Eight.  Does he ask you which film you'd like to see and then somehow you end up seeing the one he prefers?

Nine. How does he handle the car when he's in a bad mood? Does he drive like a crazy man when he's ticked off? (This is a real symptom of immaturity.)

Ten. Does he become irritated if you are late but expect you to be understanding when he is late?

Eleven. How does he feel about birth control? Does he think the entire burden should be on the woman? If, for example, you are unable to take The Pill, would he be willing to accept the responsibility to protect you from an unwanted pregnancy?

Twelve. Has he ever slapped or punched you and later said he was sorry - and then done it again?

Thirteen.  Does he treat his own mother and yours with respect?

Fourteen.  How is his sense of humor? Can he laugh at himself or does he see

something funny only at the expense of others.

Fifteen.  How is his credit? Is he inclined to buy things on impulse, then have

trouble paying his bills?

Sixteen.    Is he truthful, or have you caught him in little lies which he has

tried to wriggle out of?

Seventeen.  Do you really enjoy his company - even when you are sitting

silently?

Eighteen.  Have you thought about what he'll be like in 25 years?    Do you

honestly want to live with him till death do you part? Sign me - Sorry Now I

Never Asked

 

Dear Never: Thank you for allowing millions to learn from your experience. These questions are superb guidelines to the true character of a man.

 

To Equity theorists, such "advice" is wildly impractical. Of course Everyman and Everywoman desires perfection. Unfortunately, they are not very likely to get it. Although a perfect man might be able to attract a perfect woman, and vice-versa, humans with human flaws had better resign themselves to the fact that they will have to settle for other people no better and no worse than themselves.

A variety of equity theorists have argued that equity considerations are important determinants of who dates whom and who marries whom. For example, Blau (1968) observes that people end up with the mates they "deserve." He points out that if one hopes to reap the benefits of associating with another, he must offer his partner enough to make it worthwhile for him or her to stay in the relationship. Thus, the more desirable a suitor is, the more desirable a partner he can attract. A less desirable fellow will have to settle for a less desirable "leftover." Thus, Blau argues, market principles insure that each person gets as desirable a mate as he "deserves."

Goffman (1952) puts the matter even more succinctly. He notes:

 

A proposal of marriage in our society tends to be a way in which a man sums up his social attributes and suggests to a woman that hers are not so much better as to preclude a merger or a partnership in these matters. (p. 456)

 

On the basis of such reasoning, exchange theorists16 proposed a "matching hypothesis" - they proposed that the more equitable a romantic relationship is, the more likely it is to progress to marriage.

According to Equity theorists and matching theorists, equitable relationships should be far more stable than inequitable ones.

Is there any evidence that equity considerations are an important determinant of who dates whom and who marries whom? Is there any evidence that people do end up with partners who are no better and no worse than they "deserve"? No. Unfortunately, the Equity mate-selection hypothesis has never been tested directly. No theorist has calculated how equitable/inequitable dating couples' relationships are,17 and watched to see if, in fact, the more equitable the relationship, the more likely it is to survive. There are some data that lend some credibility to the hypothesis that equity considerations do operate in mate selection, however.

 

FIGURE 6.4.  ". . . the More Equitable a Romantic Relationship Is, the More Likely It Is to Progress to Marriage."

 

 

Let us now examine the experimental evidence.

 

The Experimental Evidence

 

For years, Marriage  and the  Family researchers have explored the process of homogamy: the tendency for similar individuals to be drawn to each other. This literature provides evidence that if a person possesses one important input - say physical attractiveness, or a dependable character, or warmth, he will be more successful than his peers in attracting partners who possess that same asset.

 

Beauty. A number of researchers have demonstrated that couples tend to date and to marry those who are similar in physical attractiveness. Walster, Aronson, Abrahams, and Rottmann (1966) were the first to test the matching hypothesis. They proposed two hypotheses: (a) the more "socially desirable" an individual is (i.e., the more physically attractive, personable, famous, rich, considerate), the more socially desirable he or she will expect a "suitable" romantic partner to be; (b) couples who are similar in social desirability will more often continue to date one another and will better like one another than will couples who are markedly mismatched.

Figure 6.5 depicts graphically these predictions.

The authors' hypotheses were tested in a field study. College freshmen were invited to attend a "computer dance." They were told their partner would be assigned by a computer. The freshman's social desirability was roughly tapped by assessing one social input - physical attractiveness. (The authors hired four students to rate each person's looks as he or she waited to purchase a ticket to the dance.) The authors also tried to assess a few of the freshman's other social inputs; i.e., personality, intelligence, and social skills. (They gave each student a battery of personality and I.Q. tests during orientation week.)

FIGURE 6.5.  Amount of Liking Predicted for Dates of Various Attractiveness by Ugly, Average, and Attractive Students.

 

First, the authors predicted that students would expect the "all-knowing" computer to assign them partners of approximately their own social desirability. At the time the attractive, average, or unattractive freshmen signed up for the dance, they were asked how socially desirable they expected their date to be. (They were asked how physically attractive, how personally attractive, and how considerate they expected him or her to be.) The authors predicted that the more attractive the freshman, the more desirable he would expect an appropriate date to be. This prediction was confirmed.

Secondly, the authors also predicted that the more equitable a computer match was, the more viable the relationship would be. The freshmen who signed up for the dance were randomly assigned to a date. It was hypothesized that those students who obtained, by chance, dates of their own social desirability level (whether high, medium, or low) would like each other more than those who received dates whose social desirability level was far inferior or far superior to their own.

The validity of this hypothesis was tested in three ways. First, during intermission, students were asked how much they liked their date. Second, they were asked how eager they were to continue the dating relationship. Third, the authors interviewed all participants six months after the dance, in order to determine whether or not the couples had actually continued to date.

This time, the authors found no support for the matching hypothesis. Everyone, regardless of their own social desirability, liked the most desirable dates. The more physically attractive the date, the more he or she was liked. The Walster et al. results, or lack thereof, were substantiated by other investigators.18

This conclusion drew a storm of protest. Subsequent investigators pointed out that the computer dance situation was not an optimal setting in which to test the hypothesis. For example, Berscheid, Dion, Walster, and Walster (1971) pointed out that in the computer dance setting, individuals believed the computer had paired up couples. They may have assumed the computer knew something they didn't. In a normal dating situation, however, Berscheid speculated, individuals might be much more concerned with whether they were too good for their partner (and thus should be careful not to get too involved in a potentially awkward situation), or whether their partner was too good for them (and thus might reject them).

The authors conducted two experiments to determine if the matching principle would reveal itself under more favorable circumstances. In both experiments, "matchmakers" assessed the physical attractiveness of college students. Then the matchmakers gave students a chance to choose dates from a number of possibilities. Both experiments found support for the matching principle; as in the Walster et al. study, everyone preferred the physically attractive dates. Within this general trend, however, it was clear that highly attractive men and women did choose more attractive dates than did less attractive individuals.19

Kiesler and Baral (1970) were the first to confirm equity matching predictions in an experimental setting. The authors invited college men to see how well they could do on a new intelligence test. In the High self-esteem condition, men were led to believe that they were doing extremely well. (The experimenter smiled and nodded and mentioned how extraordinarily well they were doing.) In the Low self-esteem condition, men were led to believe that they were doing badly on the test. (The experimenter made it apparent that he was displeased with their performance. He frowned, looked away, and mentioned that other subjects had performed better.)

During a break in testing, the experimenter and the subject visited a nearby canteen to relax. When they entered the canteen, the experimenter recognized a girl (actually an experimental confederate). In one condition, the Attractive condition, the confederate was made-up to be very physically appealing; she wore becoming make-up and fashionable clothing. In the Unattractive condition, she was fairly unattractice; she wore no make-up, heavy glasses, and had her hair pulled back with a rubber band. Her skirt and blouse clashed and were sloppily arranged.

The girl sat down and began chatting with the experimenter and the subject. After a minute, the experimenter excused himself to make a phone call. While he was gone, the couple continued their conversation. Secretly, the girl attempted to assess how interested each man seemed to be in her. She kept track of whether he ignored her when she said she'd better be getting back to work, complimented her, offered her a cigarette, offered to buy her a snack or coffee, asked for her phone number, or asked her for a date.

Kiesler and Baral found strong support for the matching hypothesis. When the men's self-esteem had been raised, they behaved most romantically with the attractive confederate. When their self-esteem had been lowered, they behaved most romantically with the less attractive confederate. The study supports the matching contention that the more desirable a man feels, the more attractive a woman he will feel entitled to.

In one final study, Morse, Reis, and Gruzen (1973) found evidence that equity considerations become increasingly important as heterosexual interactions progress. The authors found that in an initial encounter, college men's interest in a female confederate was strictly a function of her attractiveness. The more beautiful she was, the more interested they were - period. But as time passed, things changed. The men's self-esteem (and probably their perception of how likely they were to win her approval) began to operate. Men with high self-esteem continued to express great interest in dating the most attractive girl. Men with low self-esteem began to express less interest in dating her.

 

Matching, fait accompli. There is some correlational evidence that men and women of equal physical attractiveness do tend to pair up.

Silverman (1971), examined the degree of similarity in attractiveness exhibited by couples observed in naturalistic dating settings. Teams of observers (two males and two females each) went to such dating habitats as bars, social events, and theater lobbies where they could watch young dating couples. Each observer rated the dating partner of the opposite sex on a five-point scale. Silverman and his associates found an extraordinarily high degree of similarity in physical attractiveness between the dating partners. While the distribution of attractiveness scores of the men and women ranged from one to five (in intervals of .5), Silverman found that sixty percent of the couples were separated only by half a scale point; eighty-five percent of the couples were separated by one scale point, or less, and no couple was separated by more than 2.5 scale points.

In addition to rating the physical attractiveness level of the dating partners, the observers recorded whether the couples engaged in intimate touching (such as holding hands) during the period of observation. Silverman hypothesized that couples more similar in attractiveness would be happier with each other, and this would be reflected in their degree of physical intimacy. The data revealed that sixty percent of the couples who were highly similar in physical attractiveness level engaged in intimate physical contact of some kind, as compared to forty-six percent of the moderately similar couples, and twenty-two percent of those in the lowest similarity group.

Silverman's evidence of fait accompli matching along the physical attractiveness dimension is not as unequivocal as one would like. Despite the fact that observers did not know how the other observers rated the attractiveness of the other member of the dating pair, they did, of course, see the dating partners. Thus, it is possible that a "halo" emanating from one dating partner to the other may have produced artifactually similar ratings of dating pairs.20  The fait accompli matching hypothesis might be best tested under conditions in which judges of participants' attractiveness are not aware of who is paired with whom. Murstein (1972) did just that. Murstein secured photographs of ninety-nine steady or engaged couples. Then raters rated the physical attractiveness of each man and woman - separately. Murstein found evidence of matching along the physical attractiveness dimension. The steadily dating or engaged couples were far more similar in appearance than were artificially paired couples (which were formed by randomly pairing the physical attractiveness scores of the ninety-nine men and women with each other). Murstein concluded, "Individuals with equal market value for physical attractiveness are more likely to associate in an intimate relationship such as premarital engagement than individuals with disparate values." (p. 11)

 

Matching: More Complex Cases

 

In the preceding section, we reviewed evidence that individuals who possess one asset - physical attractiveness - have an advantage in attracting similarly attractive partners. Of course, individuals can contribute many other inputs to a relationship; i.e., a dependable character, warmth, etc.

Marriage and family researchers provide additional evidence that individuals who possess such assets as mental or physical health, high socioeconomic status, intelligence, and other social assets have an especially good chance of "capturing" partners with comparable assets.

Burgess and Wallin (1953) conducted the classic study of "homogamy in social characteristics" of engaged couples. The authors found evidence of homogamy (i.e., evidence that the engaged couples were very similar) on almost every characteristic they investigated. Of special interest to us is the fact that individuals were found to match up with partners who possessed similar assets and liabilities; i.e., such inputs as (1) physical assets (i.e., physical appearance and health); (2) mental health (i.e., "neuroticism" scores); (3) family's solidity (i.e., happiness of parents' marriage, etc.); (4) family background (including race, religion, parents' status, educational level, and income); (5) popularity (i.e., number of friends of the same sex as well as the opposite sex, tendency to "stay at home" vs. be "on the go," drinking habits, smoking habits, etc.).

 

Mental Health.  Most clinicians agree that mentally healthy people and emotionally disturbed people tend to pair up. Perhaps Edmund Bergler (1948), a psychoanalyst, presents the case most strongly:

 

All stories about a normal woman who becomes the prey of a neurotic man, and vice versa [sic], or a normal man who falls in love with a highly neurotic woman, are literary fairy tales. Real life is less romantic; two neurotics look for each other with uncanny regularity. Nothing is left to chance as far as emotional attachments are concerned. (p. 11)

 

Equity theorists, of course, might interpret Bergler's data a little differently. It may well be that both normals and neurotics desire well-adjusted partners, but only normals are able to attract and hold them. Neurotics must settle for partners whose adjustment is as poor as their own.

In any case, there is some relatively hard evidence that people tend to date and marry those who are similar in level of adjustment.21 For example, Murstein (1967a) asked engaged couples to complete the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Murstein recorded partners' overall MMPI profile scores and their score on such specific MMPI components as ego-strength, anxiety, and repression. Then, six months later, Murstein asked couples if they had made any courtship progress; if they were closer, the same, or further from becoming a permanent couple than before. Murstein found that the more similar in mental health couples were, the more viable their relationship was. Murstein (1967b) provides additional evidence that people end up being paired with partners who are as mentally healthy (or neurotic) as themselves.

 

Physical Health. Eugencists have observed that people are likely to marry partners with comparable physical disabilities. For example, in an article in the Eugenics Quarterly, Spuhler (1968) reviews forty-two studies of assortative mating. The studies investigated whether or not "like-married-like" based on 105 different physical characteristics, ranging from broad characteristics such as "general health" (which was assessed via nine different indicants), to specific ones such as "systolic blood pressure" and "ear lobe length." When we examine Spuhler's tabulation (see Table 6.1) we see that married couples are homogonously matched on five of the nine physical health indicants; i.e., general health, number of injuries, constitutional diseases, tuberculosis, and rheumatism. They are randomly matched on three traits, and they are heterogeneously matched ("selecting a mate unlike themselves") on only one trait - number of illnesses.

 

Intelligence and Education. A great deal of attention has been given to the fact that people tend to pair up with partners who are simlilar in education and intelligence. There is evidence that men and women marry partners of comparable intelligence22 and evidence that they marry partners of comparable educational attainment.23

 

TABLE 6.1. Studies of Assortative Mating with Respect to Physical Characteristics. (From J.N. Spuhler, "Assortative Mating with Respect to Physical Characteristics," Eugenics Quarterly, 15, 1968, p. 134. Reprinted by permission.)

 

Matching: More Complex Cases. Thus far, we have reviewed only the evidence that documents the tendency of people to pair off with partners who possess similar traits. Of course, theorists have noted that couples can be "matched" in a variety of ways. For example, the handsome man (who is not especially dependable or warm) may use his assets to "buy" a beautiful partner, or he may decide to pursue a partner who is far plainer but far more dependable and warm than he is. Murstein, Goyette, and Cerreto (1974) provide a compelling description of the way such complex matching might operate:

 

A handsome man is seen with a woman of mediocre attractiveness. "I wonder what he sees in her?" may be the quizzical question of a bystander. Quite possibly, she possesses compensating qualities such as greater intelligence, interpersonal competence, and wealth than he, of which the bystander knows nothing. . . .

Another case of compensatory exchange might be indicated if an aged statesman proposed marriage to a young beautiful woman. He would probably be trading his prestige and power for her physical attractiveness and youth. (pp. 3-4)

 

The evidence is sparse, but that which does exist supports the contention that people do engage in such complicated balancing and counter-balancing in selecting mates. Let us review this research.

Beauty can "buy" high socioeconomic status: Elder (1969) proposed that beautiful women can have an advantage in attracting highly successful mates.

In the 1930s, the Oakland Growth Study rated fifth and sixth grade girls' physical attractiveness; they rated the girls' coloring, goodness of features, physique, and grooming, and sex appeal. Years later, Elder tracked down the girls and found out what had become of them. He found that the more attractive the preteen, the "better" she had done. The beautiful girls apparently used their beauty to "capture" mates whose "mobility potential" and "social status" far exceeded their own. Additional support for Elder's contention comes from Holmes and Hatch (1938).

Beauty can "buy" high socioeconomic status, a loving nature, and sacrifice: In a recent study, Berscheid, Walster, and Bohrnstedt (1973) encouraged Psychology Today magazine readers to fill out a questionnaire concerning their current dating, mating, or marital relations; 62,000 readers replied.

The authors selected a sample of 2,000 questionnaires for analysis. They stratified the sample on sex and age to approximate the national distributions. The final sample consisted of half men and half women. Within each sex, forth-five percent were 24 years old or younger, twenty-five percent were between 25 and 44, and the rest were 45 or older.

Berscheid et al. proposed that a beautiful woman or handsome man has an advantage in attracting a successful, loving, self-sacrificing, personable, and sexually tolerant mate. They argued that if a person had vastly "superior" inputs to his partner in one sphere, say physical attractiveness, he could use that to attract and keep a partner who contributed more than his share in other spheres. (For example, the aesthetically "inferior" partner might contribute more than his share of money, affection, or kindness and considerateness.)

Berscheid et al. tested their hypothesis in the following way. First of all, the authors asked respondents how attractive they and their partners were.

 

Describe your partner's physical appearance now:

Much more physically attractive than I.

Slight more physically attractive than I.

As attractive as I.

Slightly less attractive than I.

Much less attractive than I.

 

On the basis of the respondents' replies, they divided respondents into three groups: individuals who were far more attractive than their partners, those who were just about as attractive as their partners, and those who were far less attractive than their partners.

As predicted, the authors found that the more attractive a person is compared to his partner, the richer, the more loving, and the more self-sacrificing his partner was likely to be.

Income: The authors asked respondents to assess their own and their partners' socioeconomic status (i.e., occupational level, income, and educational level). As predicted, the more attractive an individual, male or female, is (compared to his partner), the richer his "inferior" partner is. (The Jacqueline Kennedy-Aristotle Onasis arrangement apparently was not an uncommon one.)

A loving nature: The authors asked respondents to assess the extent to which they provided each other with potent rewards of love and affection.

 

In almost every relationship one person loves more than the other. Who now loves most in your relationship?

I love more.

We love equally.

My partner loves more.

 

As predicted, the more an individual's beauty exceeds his partner's, the more loving a person the "inferior" partner is.

Self-sacrifice: Finally, the authors asked respondents how much effort they and their partners expended to please one another.

 

In many dating or marriage relationships, one partner makes more effort to please. Describe the effort you now make.

Great effort.

Considerable.

Minimal.

None.

 

Describe the effort your partner now makes to please you.

Great effort.

Considerable.

Minimal.

None.

 

As predicted, they found that the more an individual's beauty exceeds his partner's, the more kind and considerate the "inferior" partner is.

Apparently, then, the assett of beauty can be used to attract a beautiful partner; or it can be used to attract a partner who possesses quite different assets.24

 

Summary. We can conclude from the preceding studies that individuals prefer romantic partners who are more desirable than themselves. However, their romantic choices are influenced by realistic matching considerations. People tend to end up choosing partners of approximately their own social worth. Romantic choices appear to be a delicate compromise between one's desire to capture an ideal partner and one's realization that he must eventually settle for what he deserves.

 

The Operation of Equity in Day-to-Day Relations

 

The preceding evidence, then, leads us to believe that most couples start off in equitable relationships.

Relationships, however, do not always stay that way. In the course of a marriage, the marital balance may shift many times. Drastic marital shifts may be produced by a variety of factors:

 

Getting Acquainted. Regardless of how well engaged or newly married couples think they know one another, they are likely to make some marked discoveries about their own, and their partner's, characteristics once they begin living together. Participants may come to realize that the relationship they thought would be so equitable, is, in fact, grossly inequitable.

 

Day-to-Day Changes. Over the years, people change. The shy young bride may become less shy but far more witty and compassionate after raising four or five impish children. Her devil-may-care bridegroom may settle down and become far more dependable, but more irritable, than the man she married. Such mundane changes, too, may produce inequities.

 

Dramatic Changes. Sometimes dramatic changes occur in partners' "assets" and "liabilities." Eventually, the impoverished medical student is transformed into an affluent doctor. The once "good provider" may be laid off. The ugly-duckling wife may join Weight Watchers and emerge a desirable swan. The handsome soldier may become a scarred paraplegic. Such changes may, of course, drastically alter a relationship's balance.

 

The Dynamics of Equitable/Inequitable Relationships

 

One exciting question that Equity theorists have asked is: What effects do such inevitable changes in the equitableness/inequitableness of a relationship have on the dynamic equilibrium of a marriage? Equity theorists maintain that the smallest of changes in a marriage's balance should send reverberations throughout the entire system. This is a fascinating contention, but, unfortunately, not enough data yet exist to determine whether or not it is true.

Let us consider the research that does exist.

Berscheid et al. (1973) posed an intriguing question. They acknowledged that probably most married people, most of the time, do end up with the partners they "deserve." But, they asked, what happens when a person "beats the odds?" What happens when, through some fluke, day-to-day change, or momentous historical accident, a person ends up with a partner who is clearly "superior" or "inferior" to himself?

The authors made a series of predictions:

 

Hypothesis I: Mismatched Relationships are Unhappy Relationships. Interestingly enough, the authors predicted that both partners in inappropriate matches would be unhappy. It is obvious why the "superior" partner would be dissatisfied. Every time he looks around, he realizes that he is sacrificing rewards to which he is entitled. But, his "lucky" mate may not be so lucky either. The "inferior" mate is confronted with a wrenching dilemma. On one hand, he is eager to keep his prestigious prize; he is well aware that he has little chance of attracting so desirable a partner a second time. On the other hand, he is also painfully aware that his partner has little reason to stay with him.

For these reasons, the authors predicted that both the superior and the inferior partner in an inequitable relationship would feel uneasy about their relationship; they would both suspect that their alliance might be unstable.

Waller (1937) and Blau (1964) would make similar predictions. Citing the epigram that "in every love affair there is one who loves and one who permits himself to be loved," Waller points out that inequitable relationships are costly to both partners. The less dependent person feels guilty and uncomfortable about exploiting his or her mate. The more dependent person feels insecure and exploited. Waller predicted that such lopsided affairs come to sad ends. Blau (1964) agrees. He notes:

 

If a love relationship is to develop into a lasting mutual attachment, then the "lovers' affection for and commitment to one another (must) expand at roughly the same pace." That is, if one lover makes significantly greater inputs than the other into the relationship, this "invites exploitation or provokes feelings of entrapment, both of which obliterate love. . . . The weak interest of the less committed or the frustrations of the more committed probably will sooner or later prompt one or the other to terminate it." (pp. 84-35)

 

For these reasons, Berscheid et al. (1973) predicted that both the superior and the inferior partner in an inequitable relationship would feel uneasy about their relationship; they would both suspect that their alliance might be an unstable one. Support of this hypothesis comes from several experiments.

Walster, Walster, and Traupmann (1977) interviewed 500 University of Wisconsin men and women, who were dating "casually" or "steadily." First they asked students to consider all the things a man or woman could contribute to a relationship and all the things they could get out of a relationship and then to estimate how their relationship "stacked up" on the Walster (1977) Global Measures of Participants' Perceptions of Inputs, Outcomes, and Equity/Inequity.

Then they asked men and women: "When you think about your relationship - what you put into it and what you get out of it - how does that make you feel? How content do you feel? How happy do you feel? How angry do you feel? How guilty do you feel?

The authors found that the more equitable a couple's relationship, the more content and the happier they were. As Table 6.2 indicates, those men and women who feel they are getting far more than they really deserve from their partners are uncomfortable. They feel less content, less happy, and a lot more guilty than their peers. Of course, those men and women who feel they deserve a lot more than they're getting are understandably upset too. They feel a lot less content, less happy, and a lot angrier than their peers.

 

TABLE 6.2.  The Effect of Equity/Inequity on Contentment/Distress.

 

 

Berscheid et al. (1973) also provide some evidence in support of their hypothesis. The authors requested Psychology Today readers to fill out a questionnaire concerning their current dating, mating, or marital relations. They measured readers' perceptions of the equitableness/inequitableness of their dating, mating, or marital relationships via a single question.

 

Describe your partner's desirability:

Much more desirable than I.

Slightly more desirable than I.

As desirable as I.

Slightly less desirable than I.

Much less desirable than I.

 

Then they asked readers how satisfied they were with their marital relationships. As predicted, readers who were matched with "appropriate" partners were more satisfied with their relationships than were individuals whose partners were far more, or far less, desirable than themselves.

 

Hypothesis II: If You're #2, You Have to Try Harder.  The authors' second prediction was equally provoking.

The authors proposed that all marriages are in a dynamic equilibrium. They argued that any time a disequilibrium occurs in a marriage, both the superior and inferior partners will automatically try to set things right. They will work to make their relationship actually more equitable, and/or they will try to convince themselves (and their partner) that their relationship is really more equitable than it seems.

Restoration of actual equity: One way participants in an inequitable relationship can restore equity is by inaugurating real changes in the relationship. The superior partner, who feels that he is contributing far more than his fair share to the relationship, will naturally be motivated to set things right by demanding better treatment from his partner. The inferior partner, who knows he is contributing less than his share, may reluctantly agree to cede such rewards.

For example, Physical appearance: The superior partner, who resents the fact that he's already contributing far more than his share to the relationship, can easily slip into becoming careless about the stylishness of his dress, his cleanliness, or his diet. Day-to-day talk: Or, the superior partner might begin to feel that he's entitled to conversation when he feels like it, and solitude when he doesn't; that he's entitled to be grumpy when he feels like it, but his partner isn't. Financial security: The superior partner might feel a little less pressure to work hard (or to save money) so that his partner can have the things she wants. Expressions of love and affection: The superior partner might become a little less careful to reassure his partner that he loves and admires her. Self-sacrifice: The superior partner might become especially reluctant to make sacrifices for his partner's benefit. When an argument arises as to whether they should go to a play or on a hunting trip, or who should take the car in for servicing, or whose mother they should visit at Christmas, he may be inclined to take a stronger stand than usual. Sex: The person who feels he's already putting too much into the marriage may feel reluctant to sacrifice himself to make his partner's sexual life fulfilling. He might feel that his partner should be as warm or as aloof as he prefers; that his partner should be willing to explore the sexual practices that he likes; that his partner should be tolerant of his extramarital affairs, but refrain from making him jealous and insecure.

Of course, the inferior partner's reactions would be quite different. The person who feels he's already getting very much more than he deserves might be especially eager to set things right by agreeing to treat his partner better.

There are a variety of ways, then, that a mismatched couple can restore actual equity to their relationship.

The data: Unfortunately most of the evidence in support of the contention that mismatched couples do try to "fine tune" their relationship, is anecdotal. There are some data suggesting that when a person's physical appearance changes drastically (through accident, plastic surgery, or dieting) his expectations may change too.

For example, Jones (1974), in "Marriage and the Formerly Fat: The Effect Weight Loss Has on Your Life Together," warned Weight Watchers magazine readers that:

 

Marriage, like all relationships, is a balance. When one partner is overweight, the fact has been considered, perhaps unconsciously, in setting up the balance. Obviously, when you remove the obesity, you upset the balance. The relationship shifts and takes on a different complexion.

 

In the same article, Palmer adds:

 

Gone are . . . the attempts to buy love through acquiescence and the overweight's traditional don't-make-waves-they-may-throw-you-out policy. In their place comes a new pride, an awareness of rights and a tendency to speak up for those rights. (pp. 23-50)

 

There is also a limited amount of survey data that supports the contention that any change in the equity of a relationship sends reverberations throughout the entire system.

For example, the depression afforded Komarovsky (1971) a tragic opportunity to study the impact of a dramatic change in the marital balance. Komarovsky reasoned that:

 

In the traditional patriarchal view of the family, the husband is expected to support and protect his wife . . . she, in turn, is expected to take care of his household, to honor and obey him. (p. 2)

 

What happens, Komarovsky asked, when a man loses his job? Does he begin to lose authority?

During the winter of 1935-36, Komarovsky contacted fifty-eight families who were receiving public assistance. In all the families, before the depression, the husband had been the family's sole provider. When the depression hit, all this changed. The men lost their jobs and were forced to go on relief. Komarovsky interviewed family members to find out what impact, if any, this change had on the husband and wife's relationship. Komarovsky found that, in thirteen of the fifty-eight families, when the husband lost his ability to support his family, he began to lose his authority.

Two major types of changes occurred in families. (1) In some families, the couple's relationship began to evolve into a more egalitarian one. For example, in one family, the man began, for the first time, to take on part of the household duties. In another family, a Protestant father who had forbidden his children to go to a Catholic school, relented. (2) In a very few cases, the husbands' and wives' status was reversed. The dominant husband became totally subordinate. For example, in one family, so long as the husband was employed, his wife had treated him with careful respect. Once the depression hit, she no longer bothered to be so polite; she began to blame her husband for unemployment, ignore his wishes, complain about his behavior, argue with him, nag him constantly, and criticize him sharply, even in front of the children.

In another family, the husband admitted: "There certainly was a change in our family, and I can define it in just one word - I relinquished power in the family." (p. 31). His wife agreed and she observed: "He still wants to be boss. This is his nature, even though he knows it wouldn't be for the best. He says he is treated like a dog in the house, but that's not true." (p. 32)25

In a recent study, Walster, Traupmann, and Walster (in press) point out that Equity theorists make a clear prediction as to how equity/inequity should affect a couple's eagerness to engage in extramarital sex: i.e., the more "cheated" a person feels in his marriage the more concessions he should expect (and induce) his partner to make in the sexual area, and the more likely he should be to risk illicit extramarital sex.

To test this hypothesis, they retrieved the Berscheid et al. (1973) data and reanalyzed them.

As before, they considered Overbenefited respondents to be those whose partners were "much more" or "slightly more" socially desirable than themselves. Equitably treated respondents were those whose social desirability was equal to their own. Deprived respondents were those whose partners were "slightly less" or "much less" desirable than themselves.

Berscheid et al. assessed readers' willingness to engage in extramarital sex in two ways: They asked (l)how soon after they began living with or married their partner they first had sex with someone else, and (2) how many people they had extramarital affairs with.

The results (see Figure 6.6) provide some support for the Walster et al. hypotheses.

Overbenefited and Equitably treated men and women were very reluctant to experiment with extramarital sex. On the average, Over-benefited and Equitably treated men and women waited twelve to fifteen years before getting involved with someone else. Deprived men and women began exploring extramarital sex far earlier - approximately six to eight years after marriage. Similarly, the Overbenefited had the fewest extramarital encounters (zero to one). Equitably treated men and women had a few more, and the Deprived had the most extramarital liaisons of all (one to three).

 

FIGURE 6.6.  The Impact of Marital Overbenefit, Equity, or Deprivation on Men and Women's Eagerness to Engage in Extramarital Sex.

 

 

Restoration of psychological equity: Of course, sometimes people find it harder to change their behavior than to change their minds. Sometimes couples, threatened by the discovery that their relationship is unbalanced and unstable, prefer to close their eyes and reassure themselves that "really, everything is in perfect order."

In intimate relationships, participants may find it fairly easy to restore psychological equity. We have discussed some characteristics of casual versus intimate relationships and concluded that casual/intimate relationships differed in such characteristics as:

 

1.  Intensity of liking (loving)

2.  Depth and breadth of information exchange

3.  Length of relationship

4.  Value of resources exchanged

5.  Variety of resources exchanged

6.  Interchangeability of resources

7.  The unit of analysis: from "you" and "me" to "we"

 

We pointed out that the long-term, complex nature of intimate relationships means that even in the best of circumstances it is extremely difficult to calculate a relationship's equitableness/inequitableness. If participants expand their horizons, and try to calculate how equitable or inequitable a relationship will be over the course of a lifetime, such calculations become virtually impossible.

Probably, many couples then, when confronted with the fact that the balance of their marriage has changed, find it easiest to restore psychological equity to their relationship, and to convince themselves that these changes are not real changes, or that they are not really very important.

Leaving the field: Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973)26 point out that if a couple's relationship becomes grossly inequitable, they should often be tempted to sever it. Of course, this is far easier for dating couples than for married couples. The dating couple who "breaks up" suffers, but as Bohannan (1971) documents, the married couple who divorces suffers even more: their parents and friends express shock, they may lose rights to their children, and their close friends may drop them; it is expensive to secure a divorce and to establish and maintain two households.

Divorce, then, is costly in both emotional and financial terms.27 Yet, Equity theorists argue that if a marital relationship is unbalanced enough, and if couples can find no better way to set things right, participants may "leave the field." In 1973, 913,000 couples opted for annulment or divorce. Udry (1971) calculates that twenty to twenty-five percent of first marriages end in annulment, desertion, or divorce.

Equity theory, then, does provide a convenient paradigm for examining romantic and marital relationships. And, the sparse data that exist provide at least suggestive evidence that Equity principles do operate in determining who one selects as a mate and how they get along, day-to-day, and thereafter.

 

 

EQUITY IN PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS

 

If critics find the contention of Equity theorists that Equity principles operate in close friendships and romantic relations unsettling, they find the contention that Equity principles operate in parent-child relationships absolutely appalling. And, a number of eminent theorists share their objections.

For  example,  Douvan (1972) argues that the mother/infant relationship is an "integrative" or "heroic" relationship; one which goes beyond exchange. She comments:

 

The mother does not say to the infant, "I give you fifteen units of maternal care so that you will return to me fifteen units of filial devotion, smiles, coos, contented gurgles." (p. 9)

 

Fromm (1956) agrees. He observes:

 

Fatherly love is conditional love. Its principle is "I love you because you fulfill my expectations, because you do your duty, because you are like me. . . ." Motherly love by its very nature is unconditional. (pp. 35 - 36)

 

Yet, Equity theorists, and a few observers (often mothers), continue to assert that parent-child relations do embody equity considerations. For example, McBride (1973) notes:

 

I sincerely believe that woman's obligation to make husband and child feel good in exchange for her physical and emotional security is as much an economic issue as whether all adult women can be absorbed into the work force. Acknowledging the monetary value of keeping a house clean or providing tax credits for child care will not put an end to domestic slavery if the one-sided, give-get nature of emotional exchanges is not also altered. Women deserve status and money, but they also deserve affection, personal affirmation, and understanding. (p. 140)

 

Regardless of whether the reader finds the suggestion that Equity principles operate in the most critical of human relationships, the parent/child relationship, "appalling" or "intriguing," he probably can agree that there may be some profit in trying to apply the same Equity principles that have been applied so successfully in other areas, to parent-child relationships. It would be exciting to see if Equity theory can give us a systematic paradigm for organizing the plethora of conflicting observations about parent/child interaction processes.

Let us begin by trying to cast parent/child relationships in equity terms.

 

Parental Inputs

 

Probably everyone can agree that parents invest an enormous amount in their children.

Society provides powerful and persuasive "norms" for child-rearing. Society tells parents (1) that they "ought" to have children28 and (2) how they "ought" to raise them.29

For example, McBride (1973) complains that society tells parents, via women's magazines, newspaper articles, and government publications, what they "ought" to do with respect to every aspect of child-rearing: physical care, social development, instinctual satisfaction, moral education, need fulfillment, latent possibilities, cultural enhancement, and sexual gratification.

And, probably most parents do what they "ought"; probably most parents do invest tremendous amounts of money, time, effort, and emotional energy in their children. For example, the President's Commission on Population Growth and the American Future (1972) estimates that the typical American couple spends between $80 thousand and $150 thousand to rear two children and put them through college. Overshadowing parents' financial investments are the time, effort, and emotional energy they invest in their children.30

Do most parents, most of the time, feel that their momentous investments are repaid by the rewards of parenthood? Theorists are undecided.

Traditional observers generally assume that parent/child relationships are equitable relationships. They argue that parents' enormous investments are repaid by the rewards of parenthood.

 

Parental Outcomes: The Rewards of Parenthood

 

Traditional theorists contend that parents reap enormous intellectual and emotional rewards from their children. For example, Dr. Benjamin Spock (1957) maintains that, despite the sacrifices involved in raising children, most parents reap their greatest satisfactions in life from watching their children grow up and develop into fine people.

Waller (1938) (quoting "a pioneer nursery educator") argues that:

 

All this talk about the sacrifices of parents for their children is totally unjustified. A father fosters his own personality development by working for his children and by missing his golf game to go on a picnic with his family. The mother is fulfilling the roles she laid down as a child when she spends most of her time "growing up" a challenge to her children. Everyone gains in the "process." (p. 33)

 

There is compelling evidence that parents do glean voluminous rewards from their children. In a variety of countries, demographers have conducted large-scale and careful studies to find out what rewards couples expect to get, and, in fact do get, from children. (The governments who sponsored these surveys hoped to use such information to prod couples into producing more - or fewer - children.)

The demographers compiled an overwhelming list of "parental rewards." It appears that some parents, somewhere, sometime, find everything a child might do to be "rewarding." Hoffman and Hoffman (1973) took one look at the demographers' impressive, but unmanageable, compilations and decided that they must begin by presenting a meaningful conceptual scheme for classifying rewards. Only then could they present the demographers' potpourri of data in an orderly fashion. Thus, Hoffman and Hoffman undertook the herculean task of developing a classification scheme. They proposed the following one:

 

The Value of Children

 

Economic utility: In many countries of the world, people have children for economic reasons. Children can help around the house, in small home industries, in hunting, and in the fields.31 In all cultures, children are expected to support their parents in illness or in old age.32

Adult status and social identity: Many people have children in an effort to demonstrate that they are truly adult, independent, and acceptable members of the community.33

Expansion of the self, tie to a larger entity, "immortality: " Many people have children in order to attain a kind of "immortality." For example, Swain and Kiser (1953) found that three-fourths of the parents they interviewed reported that one of their greatest parental satisfactions was in knowing that some part of them would live on in their children after they were gone. (Rainwater, 1960 confirms this observation.)

Morality: religion, altruism, good of the group; norms regarding sexuality, impulsivity, virtue:

 

. . . and God said unto them Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth.

                                                                                                          Genesis 1:27,28

 

Parents sometimes have children in order to demonstrate to themselves (and others) that they are "moral" men and women. Others have children simply because "society expects them to." According to Udry (1971):

 

As a child one learns that people grow up and have children, the children in turn, have children, and so on for generations. When one reaches adulthood, he also expects to have children, not especially for any particular gratification, but just because "people do." (p. 438)

 

Primary group ties, affection: People often have children in order to gain love and companionship.34

Stimulation, novelty, fun: People also have children because they find them intellectually and emotionally stimulating. For example, Waller (1938) points out that parents gain new insights into themselves, into others, and into life processes from watching children develop. Many parents also have children because of the "fun" they provide.35

Achievement, competence, creativity-. Parents often feel a strong sense of accomplishment when they are able to produce a child, and eventually to meet the challenges and crises that inevitably arise during the child-rearing process.36

Power, influence, effectance: The power of parent over child is almost without parallel. Parenthood gives many people a unique opportunity to guide and control another human being. For example, Coles (1967) found that lower class black women felt that there was only one way they could have any effect in life - by becoming a mother.

Social comparison, competition: Some parents take pride in providing irrefutable evidence that they have sufficient sexual maturity, virility, and potency to reproduce.37 Other parents take pride, not in the quantity of their children, but in the quality. For example, American parents often take pride in the fact that their child is a member of "Little League," "gets all A's," or is "my son, the doctor."

 

All in all, many parents clearly do feel that their staggering investments in their children are "paid back" by the rewards they receive from them. In 1957, the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research interviewed a random sample of 2,460 Americans.38 Among other things, the authors asked: "Thinking about a man's (woman's) life, how is a man's (woman's) life changed by having children?" Fifty percent of the fathers and forty-three percent of the mothers felt that parenthood had enriched their lives. Only ten percent of the fathers and twenty-two percent of the mothers felt that parenthood had changed their lives for the worse.

For these reasons then, many social commentators - especially traditional social commentators - conclude that parents are amply repaid for their emotional and monetary investments by the rewards they receive.

Some observers, however, are not so sanguine. They argue that parent/child relationships are inequitable relationships. They admit that parenthood does offer some of the rewards we have enumerated. But, they argue, these rewards are overshadowed by some serious costs that the traditionalists conveniently neglect to mention.

 

Parental Outcomes: The Costs of Having Children

 

Even in nonegalitarian marriages, the relationship between husband and wife is a matter of give and take toward each other. The relationship between a mother and her children is that she gives and they take. (Radl, 1973, p. 21)

LeMasters (1957) asked a sample of parents how they had felt following the birth of their first child. He found that in eighty-three percent of the families, the child's birth provoked an extensive or severe crisis:39

 

The mothers reported the following feelings or experiences in adjusting to the first child: loss of sleep (especially during the early months); chronic "tiredness" or exhaustion; extensive confinement to the home and resulting curtailment of their social contacts; giving up the satisfactions and the income of outside employment; additional washing and ironing; guilt at not being a "better" mother; the long hours and seven days (and nights) a week necessary in caring for an infant; decline in their housekeeping standards; and worry over their appearance (increased weight after pregnancy, et cetera).

The fathers echoed most of the above adjustments but also added a few of their own: decline in sexual response of wife; economic pressure resulting from the wife's retirement plus additional expenditures necessary for child; interference with social life; worry about a second pregnancy in the near future; and general disenchantment with the parental role. (p. 354)

 

A multitude of demographers and social commentators provide haphazard information about the "costs" of parenthood. Pohlman (1969), following Hoffman and Hoffman's lead, provides a classification scheme for describing these "costs."

 

Some Costs of Conception

 

Financial costs of children: Children are expensive. Optimists may claim that "two can live as cheaply as one," but no one has ever suggested that three, four, or more can.

Most couples find it extremely difficult to make ends meet. In some families, parents try to meet their financial obligations by "moonlighting" (taking on extra work). In others, they simply try to stretch their  income  more  ways.  According  to  economists,  regardless  of whether couples have none, one, or several children, they spend about the same proportion of their budget on housing, food, clothing, transportation, and medical care. What parents do sacrifice, is the quality of their housing, food, etc. For example, parents, especially those with many children, must settle for less elegant, less conveniently located, and more crowded housing. They must settle for smaller and cheaper cuts of meat, and more starchy foods. They must wait until they are seriously ill before going to a doctor.40 Demographers find that most parents who decide not to have any more children, do so for financial reasons.41

Psychological costs of children: Parents' psychological costs are often even more sobering: McBride (1973) contends that one of the heavy costs of parenthood is "loss of self."

Many parents come to resent the fact that no one seems to feel that their interests, needs, health, and beloved possessions are important. When a toddler repeatedly interrupts parents' intimate conversations, destroys their favorite books, scratches their cherished records, or disappears just as they are about to leave for important appointments, parents "childishly" feel that no one cares about them.

One of Radl's (1973) interviewees expressed this feeling as follows:

 

After getting dinner, the dishes, and the kids' baths out of the way, feeling that I'd somehow miraculously survived this particularly chaotic day, I sunk tiredly into the sofa in the living room, and for a moment forgot my exhaustion and tension. I just sat enjoying the record my husband had put on. As I was finally starting to relax and feel human, the mood was shattered by a very loud and, as always, insistent "Mommy!" coming from the vicinity of the back hall. . . . Along with being annoyed at being disturbed and interrupted yet again, I felt ashamed of myself for having such selfish thoughts.

If this kind of thing happened once a day, I wouldn't have thought anything about it; ten or twelve times - many more times even wouldn't have made me feel as if I were being attacked or punished even when I hadn't done anything to deserve disciplinary action. But the threshold had been reached somehow, and I'd gone past my normal tolerance level for routine interruptions. And those moments for myself while I was enjoying eight bars of music were well deserved and well earned. Stripping it away just then was like stripping me away personally. Pointing out to me that I don't really count, that time for me isn't even secondary to the needs, wishes, and whims of my family are these instances: instances where I have every reason to believe that I can relax only to have it demonstrated to me clearly that it isn't so. I resent this and I feel guilty over my resentment.

(From S. L. Radl, Mother's Day Is Over (New York: David McKay Company, 1973), pp. 183-184. Reprinted by permission.)

 

FIGURE 6.7.  ". . . One of the Heavy Costs of Parenthood Is 'Loss of Self.' "

 

Costs of children to husband-wife relationships: For most people, the most important goal of marriage is "companionship."42 In many marriages, the arrival of children puts a severe strain on the couple's emotional, sexual, and companionate relationship.43

There is no compelling evidence that children put such a strain on most marriages, however. A number of investigators have found that regardless of sex, race, age, or family income, childless couples are more satisfied with their marriages than couples with children. They have also found that couples with no children are happier than couples with three or more children.44

However, a considerable number of other investigators have found that there is no relationship between number of children and marital adjustment.45 In fact, a few investigators have even found that childless couples are less happy than their counterparts with children.46

Thus, it appears that although many, and perhaps even most, couples' relationships are marred by the arrival of children, some parents do manage to avoid this "cost."

Some other costs of children: Pohlman (1969), along with a variety of other authors, discuss the enormous day-to-day costs of having children.

Concern about the child's development: Pohlman points out that parents are responsible for the mental and physical health of their children. Most parents find this an overwhelming assignment.

In relatively homogeneous and stable cultures, all that "good" parents have to do is raise their children in traditional ways. In the United States, physicians and child psychologists continually give parents conflicting advice. For example, the United States Children's Bureau has published ten editions of Infant Care. Wolfenstein (1953) reviewed changes in the advice given over the last forty years. Advice has ranged from great strictness to permissiveness. Pohlman observes that:

 

As a result of all the change and diversity, the parent can be sure that any procedures he follows will be criticized by someone. And if the child does not turn out right, it is the parents' fault; mothers-in-law, preachers, and psychologists are in general agreement on this. (p. 102)

 

Parents are also responsible for constantly checking on toddlers to make sure that they aren't in trouble. Radl (1973) observes how oppressive this responsibility can be:

 

One day, Adam disappeared. The police combed the area for one agonizing hour before he was found by some neighborhood boys. He was only three years old; one minute he was in our fenced back yard, and the next minute - gone! I was terrified. . . . One father pointed out that he had never thought much about hammers until he saw his two-year-old with one - the little boy was ready to hit his four-year-old brother on the head. A mother tells of her little boy running into the house with his head bleeding. It seems that he and a playmate were digging in the back yard. She had no idea where they got a pick ax, but they did, and a fight broke out. The result was a visit to the emergency ward. (p. 72)

 

Parents know that if they are negligent, just once, the consequences can be tragic. For example, in 1972, 5,000,000 children drank lethal amounts of medicine, cleaning solvents, and other poisons.

Time and hard work: In addition to watching their children to make sure they're safe, parents must prepare special meals for them, keep them clean, arrange special appointments for them, cart them from place to place, plus do their usual household chores. It is not surprising then to discover that parents (especially mothers) end up spending a startling amount of time on housework.

 

FIGURE 6.8. Hours Spent in Housework, Classified by Age of Youngest Child. (From Blood, 1962, 420. Adapted from Wilson, 1929, 29 and Wiegand, 1954, 18. Reprinted from E. Pohlman, The Psychology of Birth Planning, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing, 1969, p. 111.)

 

 

Wilson (1929) and Wiegand (1954), in two studies conducted a quarter of a century apart, interviewed women about their working patterns. From the authors' data (see Figure 6.8), we can draw several conclusions: (a) Women with no children have the lightest work load. (They spend thirty to fifty hours per week on housework.) (b) Women are forced to spend twice as much time (sixty-five to ninety-five hours per week) on housework after the arrival of their first child, (c) The younger the child, the more time a mother is forced to spend on housework. Mothers with preschool children spend fifty to sixty hours per week on housework. Things get slightly better as children get older. By the time children are between the ages of ten through seventeen, mothers spend only forty to fifty-five hours per week on housework.47

Confinement: Young parents complain that one oppressive cost of parenthood is being "tied down." For example, Dyer (1963) asked young mothers to name the most severe problem their first child's arrival had created. The wives most frequently mentioned how difficult it was to adjust to being tied down at home, and to have to give up outside activities and interests. Hoffman (1963) asked Detroit mothers how a woman's life is changed by having children. By far the most common reply was that children "tie you down."

Tiredness and physical exhaustion: In view of the preceding data, it should come as no surprise to discover that parents of young children often complain of fatigue. Pohlman (1969) points out that this tiredness "may be the result of sheer expenditure of energy. . . . However, fatigue may result from such other factors as feelings of confinement and isolation, jealousy, weariness from doing battle with children, and so on." (p. 124)

Other authors agree with Pohlman, that one of the costs of parenthood is fatigue. For example, Dyer (1963) reports that eighty-seven percent of wives complain that they are tired and exhausted most of the time.

Clausen and Clausen (1973) report:

 

The early years of motherhood are frequently remembered as a period when one constantly yearned for a full night's sleep. In our longitudinal data at the Institute of Human Development, mothers with three or more children closely spaced, looking back at the early years of motherhood from the perspective of their late forties, are likely to recall those early years as years of extreme exhaustion and discouragement, (p. 189)

 

Mess, noise, confusion, and congestion: Finally, both Pohlman (1969) and Clausen and Clausen (1973) point out that, especially during the early years, parents must live surrounded by mess, noise, confusion, and congestion.

In summary, many parents clearly do feel that parenthood's costs outweigh its rewards. In 1963, Hoffman asked young Detroit mothers a straightforward question: "How is a woman's life changed by having children?" Four times as many mothers gave totally negative answers as totally positive ones.

On the basis of the preceding data, then, many irreverent social commentators have concluded that parent-child relationships are distinctly inequitable relationships.

Probably the question of whether most parents, most of the time, are in an equitable or inequitable relationship with their children is unanswerable. The preceding section makes it clear that parent-child relationships are complex, multi-faceted, and dynamic. If we asked parents if they were receiving less than, exactly what, or more than they "deserve" from their children, they would likely give us quite different answers at different stages in life, on different days, or even at different times of the day.

 

How Do Parents Restore Equity?

 

Instead of trying to decide whether most parent-child relationships are equitable or inequitable, it is probably more profitable to speculate about how parents and children should respond during those periods, on those days, at those hours, when the parent is feeling exploited, equitably treated, or overbenefited. If readers review the Equity theory and research described in "Exploiter/Victim Relationships" (chapter 3) and in "Philanthropist/Recipient Relationships" (chapter 4), they should be able to generate a number of predictions as to how parents should respond when they feel trapped in an inequitable situation. By way of demonstration, however, let us consider the common case where a parent feels that he or she "deserves" far more out of life than he or she is receiving.

In "Philanthropist/Recipient Relations" we pointed out that even the most altruistic of people should never be able to fully resign themselves to the fact that they must sacrifice themselves for another. We pointed out that, consciously or unconsciously, the altruist will always feel fleeting twinges of distress, and feel compelled to try to "set things right."

We can think of a variety of ways in which beleaguered parents try to set things right:

 

Restoration of Actual Equity

 

Demanding Practical Benefits

 

Relationships between the generations are also too often predicated on emotional rewards, with gratitude as payment. The mother exacts a price for her devotion; "You owe it to me, after everything I've done for you, all I've given up for you." (McBride, 1973, p. 140)

 

Sometimes parents feel their children owe them practical benefits. They expect their children to console them when they're blue, entertain their friends, run errands for them, call them every week, bring their children to visit on the holidays, and, of course, support them in their old age.

 

Demanding Respect and Status. The Bible exhorts us to "Honor thy father and thy mother." The truism that "parents are entitled to respect" is so ingrained in all of us, that often we do not realize that parental inputs are linked in any way to children's obligations to supply rewards. Sadly, when parents can no longer make a "parental contribution," we are poignantly reminded that a parental contribution is often a prerequisite for parental respect.48

 

Retaliation. According to Equity theory, exploited parents can restore actual equity in still another way - by retaliating against their children.

Theoretically, society forbids such equity-restoring reactions. During infancy (and well into the toddler stage), children are not considered responsible for their actions. When a child smiles, babbles and is charming, a parent is allowed to label him a "good child." When he soils his diapers, however, cries all night, or hits his best friend on the head with a truck, he is supposed to be forgiven since he "doesn't know any better." So, theoretically, parents are not allowed to restore equity by retaliating against their children.

In fact, however, parents often do. At some time or another, most parents get so angry that they ridicule, yell at, or hit their children. Then they feel guilty. Other parents do more than that. Collins (1968) notes:

 

It is not uncommon to find battered children with broken bones, fractured skulls, brain damage, severe burns on the skin or in body cavities which have been caused by caustic substances, ruptured intestines, or other evidences of vicious attack. Doctors throughout the country who are active in the investigation and treatment of the battered child believe that the infliction of injuries by parents is a significant cause of death in infants and young children. Gill (1968) estimates that, in 1968, police, physicians, and child welfare agencies reported more than 7,000 child abuse cases. These parents, too, feel guilty. (p. 201)

 

In spite of taboos, then, some parents do restore equity via retaliation.

 

Restoration of Psychological Equity: Uneasy parents may restore equity to a parent-child relationship by trying to convince themselves that parenthood has more rewards than they had ever realized.

Simone de Beauvoir (1952) has noted that mothers are skilled at creating child-rearing rewards:

 

What is in any case remarkable and distinguishes this relation of mother and baby from all other human relations is the fact that at first the baby itself takes no active part in it: its smiles, its babble, have no sense other than what the mother gives them; whether it seems charming and unique, or tiresome, commonplace, and hateful, depends on her, not upon the baby. (p. 180)

 

Parents, who find the current rewards of parenthood distressingly low, may try to convince themselves that things will get better by and by. The parents may soothe themselves by reminding themselves that once the child gets a little older, he will give them respect and companionship. ("He'll be so proud of us, when he introduces us to all his little friends." "We'll walk together on the beach and build sand castles.") They may imagine how much fun it will be, in their old age, when all their loving grandchildren congregate for Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners.

 

Leaving the Field. In the very rare cases, a parent may psychologically or physically abandon his child. Parents can abandon their families. They can ship their children off to their parents, or to maiden aunts, or to boarding schools - or simply leave them on a doorstep somewhere. For most parents, however, this is not a realistic alternative. There are no socially acceptable ways of "divorcing" one's children. Once parents have children, they are committed to them until they become independent adults.

 

 

Summary

 

We began this chapter by pointing out that theorists are hotly divided as to whether or not equity considerations operate in such intimate relationships as close friendships, romantic and marital relationships, and parent-child relationships. We encountered a similar division when we asked colleagues, friends, or lovers about their ideas. People cling tenaciously to their own experiential facts. We were able to uncover almost no evidence, however, to allow us to arbitrate these conflicting claims. We found some evidence that equity considerations do seem to operate in close friendships and in romantic and marital relationships. We could only speculate, however, as to how equity principles might operate in parent-child relationships; no data exist. Obviously, if we are to get the glimmerings of an answer, we will have to undertake more research on this controversial question.

 

 

ENDNOTES

 

1.  See Adams and Freedman (1976) for a lucid discussion of research possibilities for Equity theory and dynamic interactions.

2.  Additional evidence in support of this contention comes from Altman and Taylor (1973), Huesmann and Levinger (1976), Jourard (1971), and Worthy, Gary, and Kahn (1969).

3.  Sometimes, participants in a relationship unknowingly operate from quite different time perspectives. Far example, a young husband may be operating on the assumption that things are fair right now. His bride may assume that, although things are grossly unfair now, "once he gets established in business," "once the baby grows up and leaves home," etc., her husband will make everything up to her. The advent of middle age, and her shattering discovery that things remain as is, or her discovery that the "indebted" spouse is about to leave, or die, may generate intense resentment and anger.

4.  See Morgan and Sawyer (1967) for a further discussion of this point.

5.  See Aronson (1970), Huesmann and Levinger (1976), and Levinger and Snoek (1972).

6.  See Donnenwerth and Foa (1974), Foa (1971), Teichman (1971), and Turner, Foa, and Foa (1971).

7.  See Foa and Foa (1974).

8.  See Scanzoni (1972) for an elaboration of this point.

9.  Boulding (1973) in The Economy of Love and Fear, presents a detailed and brilliant elucidation of this point.

10.  See, for example Cartwright and Zander (1962), Deutsch (1962), and Sigall and Landy (1974).

11.  For example, when they could reveal their answers to such questions as: What is the most you could win? What is the most he could win? What is the lowest amount you might win?

12.  This difference was not statistically significant, however.

13.  Even this champion of unconditional love, however, inadvertently finds himself in the equity camp. Although Fromm claims that equity considerations demean love relations, he is moved to promise his readers that if they love "truly" they will reap a handsome return. ". . . in truly giving, he cannot help receiving that which is given back to him. Giving implies to make the other a giver also..." (p. 21)

14.  See, for example, Murstein et al. (1974), and Douvan (1974).

15.  See, for example, Bernard (1964), Blau (1964), McCall (1966), Scanzoni (1972), and Storer (1966). At the beginning of this chapter, we pointed out that casual vs. intimate relationships differ in a number of ways. In that sense, we, too, agree that casual and intimate relationships are "different." However, we believe the same equity processes operate in both casual and intimate relations. The fact that casual and intimate relations differ in such characteristics as the time span of the relationship, the number of rewards involved in exchanges, the types of rewards involved in exchanges, and so on, should simply affect (1) how easy or difficult it is to calculate equity in a casual vs. intimate relationship and (2) how casuals vs. intimates choose to restore equity.

16.  See Backman and Secord (1959), Homans (1961), and Blau (1968).

17.  In chapter 7, we will describe some of the techniques researchers might use to determine whether a dating couples' relationship was equitable or inequitable.

18.  For example Brislin and Lewis (1968), Tesser and Brodie (1971), and Walster (1970).

19.  Additional support for the Matching hypothesis comes from Huston (1973) and Stroebe et al. (1971).

20.  See Sigall and Landy (1974).

21.  See, for example, Gottesman (1965), and Murstein (1967a).

22.  See Garrison, Anderson, and Reed (1968), Jones (1929), and Reed and Reed (1965).

23.  See Garrison, Anderson, and Reed (1968), and Riser (1968).

24.  Since Berscheid et al.'s data are correlational, it is, of course, not possible to tell whether (1) individuals were able to attract an inappropriately beautiful person, because they possessed compensating traits, or (2) whether individuals, matched with inappropriately beautiful partners, quickly tried to develop compensatory traits in order to keep the partner. Both occurrences, of course, are predicted by Equity theory. (This latter process will be discussed in the next section.)

25.  Similar results are reported by Bakke (1940a, b), who also studied the impact of the Great Depression on men and women's lives.

26.  Along with Adams and Freedman (1976), Bernard (1964), McCall (1966), Scanzoni (1972), and Thibaut and Faucheux (1965).

27.  See Bohannan (1971).

28.  See, for example, Rainwater (1965), Stycos (1955), or Whelpton et al. (1966).

29.  See, for example, Stendler (1950), Sunley (1955), and Wolfenstein (1953) for an elaboration of this point.

30.  See, for example, Clausen and Clausen (1965), Hoffman and Hoffman (1973), or Pohlman (1969).

31.  See Caldwell (1967, 1968), Dow (1967), Guthrie (1968), Fawcett and Arnold (1973), Heisel (1968), Martin (1970), and Pohlman (1969, see chapter 4).

32.  See Mueller (1970), and Streib (1958).

33.  See Sussman and Burchinal (1962a, b).

34.  See Caldwell (1967), Heisel (1968), Martin (1970), Rainwater (1965), and Whelpton et al. (1966).

35.  See Caldwell (1967, 1968), Heisel (1968), Komarovsky (1967), Mysore Population Study (1961), and Poffenberger (1969).

36.  See Centers and Blumberg (1954), Gurin et al. (1960), Meade (1971), and Rainwater (1965).

37.  See Kiser (1962), Rainwater (1960), and Stycos (1955).

38.  See Gurin, Veroff, and Feld (1960).

39.  Comparable findings have been reported by Dyer (1963), Jacoby (1969), and Silverman and Silverman (1971).

40.  See Blood (1962), or Douglas and Blomfield (1958).

41.  See Clare and Kiser (1951), Freedman et al. (1959), Rainwater (1960), and Whelpton et al. (1966).

42.  See Blood and Wolfe (1960).

43.  See Christensen (1968), Feldman (1962), and Radl (1973).

44.  See Blood and Wolfe (1960), Burgess and Cottrell (1939), Lang (1932), Reed (1947), and Renne (1970).

45.  See Bernard (1934), Davis (1929), Hamilton (1948), Karlsson (1951), *Locke (1951), and Terman (1938).

46.  See Blood and Wolfe (1960), and Farber and Blackman (1956).

47.  Data from Myrdal and Klein (1956) provide additional support for these observations.

48.  Komarovsky (1971) provides a poignant example of the fact that, although people are in accord that a father deserves respect "regardless," in fact, a father's ability to support his family is intimately tied to the respect his wife and children are willing to award to him. The families Komarovsky interviewed said such things as: "If a child is well brought up, he will certainly not lose respect for his father just because his father happens to be out of work." (pp. 75 - 76) Nonetheless, when the Great Depression hit, and these same fathers lost their ability to provide for their families, in fact, their prestige and status often deteriorated markedly.